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We provide theoretical and empirical analyses of an asymmetric-in- 
formation model of layoffs. When firms have discretion with respect 
to whom to lay off, the market infers that laid-off workers are of low 
ability. Assuming  that no  such  negative inference is  warranted if 
workers  are displaced in  a plant closing,  postdisplacement wages 
should be lower and postdisplacement unemployment spells should 
be longer for those displaced by layoffs than for those displaced by 
plant closings, but predisplacement wages should not differ by cause 
of displacement. Evidence on displaced workers from Current Pop- 
ulation Surveys supports all three of our model's predictions. 
I.  Introduction 
Since the seminal work  of  Akerlof (1976)  and Spence (1973),  labor 
economists have understood that asymmetric information about workers' 
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productive abilities can affect labor-market outcomes. A number of recent 
theoretical papers have elaborated on  this theme and also have shifted 
attention from a worker's private information (vis-a-vis prospective em- 
ployers) about his or her productive ability to an employer's private in- 
formation (vis-a-vis the market) about an employee's ability. Waldman 
(1984), Milgrom and Oster (1987), and Ricart i Costa (1988), for instance, 
describe inefficient job assignments that result when an employer has pri- 
vate information concerning employees' abilities, and Greenwald (1986), 
Lazear (1986),  and Riordan and Staiger (1987)  describe analogous con- 
sequences for wages  and mobility  in  the presence of  such asymmetric 
information. 
It seems plausible that a worker's current employer may be better in- 
formed about the worker's ability than prospective employers are, but the 
predictions generated by the existing theoretical models based on this as- 
sumption mainly concern variables that are not included in standard  micro 
data sets (such as promotions within the firm or wage offers from pro- 
spective employers).  In this article we provide theoretical and empirical 
analyses of  an asymmetric-information model  of  layoffs. The  model  is 
based on the same information asymmetry as the theoretical models de- 
scribed above but differs in that it delivers predictions that can be tested 
using standard micro data. Our theoretical model offers new answers to 
such time-honored questions as why layoffs occur and how firms determine 
which workers to lay off.) Our empirical work offers the first quantitative 
evidence consistent with the burgeoning collection of asymmetric-infor- 
mation models described above.2 
The main idea behind the article is simple. If a firm has discretion over 
whom  to lay off, then the firm's desire to retain a worker signals to the 
market that the worker is of high ability, so the market bids up the wage 
of retained workers. As a result, the firm finds it unprofitable to retain 
low-ability workers and hence lays them off.3 The market then infers that 
lOur answers  to these  questions  are  of course  complementary  to the  conventional 
wisdom  that layoffs  are  caused  by shocks  and  determined  by seniority. 
2 Antel  (1985) and  McLaughlin  (1991) find  empirical  support  for  a complemen- 
tary  class  of asymmetric-information  models  concerning  match  quality.  Our  model 
emphasizes  private  information  about a worker's  (general-purpose)  ability,  so a 
lemons effect arises  because  prospective  employers  are wary of hiring  a worker 
another  firm does not want. In the matching  model,  in contrast,  given the value 
of the match  between  a worker  and one firm,  information  about  the value  of the 
match between  the worker  and a second firm is irrelevant,  so no lemons effect 
arises. 
3 One might  ask why high- and low-ability  workers  cannot  be retained  at high 
and  low wages,  respectively.  As will become  clear  below,  the answer  is that,  if the 
firm  could  retain  low-ability  workers  at a low wage,  then  it would  also  retain  high- 
ability  workers  at this low wage, thereby  destroying  the market's  willingness  to 
allow any workers  to be retained  at the low wage. Layoffs  and Lemons  353 
laid-off workers are of low ability and so offers them low wages in their 
next jobs. We assume that workers displaced by plant closings, in contrast, 
suffer from no such adverse inference and so receive (relatively) higher 
reemployment wages from the market. Our model thus predicts that the 
postdisplacement wages of (otherwise observationally equivalent) workers 
will  differ according to the cause of  displacement. Furthermore, in our 
model it is the layoff event that signals unfavorable information to the 
market,  so the model predicts that the predisplacement  wages of (otherwise 
observationally equivalent) workers will not differ according to the cause 
of displacement. Combining these predictions, we have that the wage loss 
at displacement should be larger for those laid off than for those displaced 
by plant closings. 
In our empirical work, we use data from the Displaced Workers Sup- 
plements in the January  1984 and 1986 Current  Population Surveys.  Because 
our model assumes that the firm has discretion over whom to lay off, we 
focus on white-collar workers (rather than on blue-collar workers, whose 
jobs often are covered by collective-bargaining agreements involving ex- 
plicit layoff-by-seniority rules). In our sample (described in Sec. III below), 
the estimated mean percentage wage loss from displacement is 5.5 per- 
centage points greater for white-collar workers displaced by layoffs than 
for (otherwise observationally equivalent) white-collar workers displaced 
by plant closings. Furthermore, we find that predisplacement wages do 
not differ significantly by cause of displacement. 
A simple extension of our lemons model yields the prediction that the 
average postdisplacement unemployment  duration should be longer for 
workers displaced by layoffs than for those displaced by plant closings. 
We find that the evidence also is consistent with this prediction: workers 
laid off (and not recalled) have approximately  25% longer postdisplacement 
unemployment  spells than do  those displaced in plant closings. As we 
describe below, only part of this estimate should be attributed to a lemons 
effect, but we also report several further pieces of evidence that together 
suggest an important role for our lemons  model in accounting for the 
observed variation in postdisplacement unemployment duration by cause 
of displacement and by occupation. 
In sum, we find empirical support for all three of our model's predictions 
concerning the wages and unemployment experiences  of displaced  workers. 
In interpreting these empirical results, it is worth noting that they do not 
control for a potentially important effect in the opposite  direction: if a 
plant is large compared to its local labor market, then the increase in the 
local unemployment rate following  a plant closing seems likely both to 
depress the reemployment wages and to extend the typical unemployment 
duration of displaced workers. 
The body of the article is organized as follows.  Section II presents the 
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our model explores  how the information  signaled  by an informed  party 
in the first stage of a game endogenously  determines  the severity  of the 
uninformed  parties'  adverse-selection  (or winner's-curse)  problem  in the 
second  stage  of the game.  Sections  III and  IV present  the empirical  results 
on wages and unemployment  duration  described  above.  Finally,  Section 
V summarizes and interprets our findings. 
II. Theoretical Analysis 
In the signaling equilibria described below, a firm lays off its least pro- 
ductive workers. Prospective employers then infer that these workers are 
of low  productivity and so offer them a low  wage. We assume that no 
such negative inference is warranted after a plant closing, so the average 
reemployment wage of workers who  lose their jobs because of  a plant 
closing  is higher than that of workers who  lose their jobs because of a 
layoff. 
A.  The Model 
Our model has two periods. The major elements of the model are (1) 
the production technology,  (2)  the information structure, (3)  the com- 
mitment and contracting possibilities, and (4) the timing of events between 
periods  1 and 2. We describe each of  these elements in turn and then 
compare our model to related models developed by Greenwald (1986) and 
by Waldman (1984). 
1)  The production technology.-The  first-period output of a worker of 
(time-invariant)  productive ability rj  is yI (ii)  = rj.  The second-period output 
of  a worker of  ability rj is  y2(fl)  =  rj +  s (where s >  0)  if the worker 
remains with  the first-period employer but is y2(fl)  =  rj if the worker 
changes employers. The parameter s can be interpreted as firm-specific 
human capital and/or  as one (or even the sum) of the following transaction 
costs: a mobility cost incurred by the worker, a hiring cost incurred by a 
new employer, or a firing cost incurred  by the first-period  employer. Given 
the range of these possible interpretations of s,it  is difficult to specify how 
one might measure s. Nonetheless,  it seems plausible to us that in many 
employment relationships at least one of these potential interpretations of 
s is an important consideration. 
2)  The information  structure.-At  the beginning of the first period, in- 
formation is symmetric but imperfect: based on the observable character- 
istics of a given worker, all firms and the worker share the belief that the 
worker's productive ability is distributed according to the probability dis- 
tribution  F(,q) on (AL,  At)  with densityf(n). At the end  of the first  period, 
the worker's current employer (hereafter also called the firm) observes the 
worker's first-period output and so perfectly infers the worker's ability, 
but prospective employers (hereafter  also called the market) do not observe 
output and so do not (yet) update their beliefs about the worker's ability. Layoffs  and Lemons  355 
Finally, to keep things simple, we make assumptions below (on the kinds 
of wage and employmernt  contracts that are feasible) to guarantee that it 
is immaterial whether or not the worker observes first-period output. 
In the interest of clarity, we impose a (rather weak) regularity condition 
on the distribution of productive ability:  f(,)  must be log concave (i.e., 
lnf(,q)  must be concave in ri), which implies that d{E(riln  2  x)}/dx 
<  1 for every x.4 Many familiar distributions-including  the  uniform, 
Normal, exponential, and beta distributions-satisfy  this condition. Fur- 
thermore, the truncation of a log-concave distribution is log concave. 
We also impose an assumption relating the importance of firm-specific 
capital and the distribution of ability:  sL  +  s < E(n).  As will become clear 
below, the model is trivial without this assumption because a first-period 
employer can afford to retain even the lowest-ability worker for the second 
period, even if prospective employers offer a wage equal to the expected 
ability of the entire population of workers. 
3)  Contracting possibilities.-We  assume that neither contingent  nor 
long-term contracts are possible: the first-period wage is determined at 
the beginning of the first period, the second-period wage is determined at 
the beginning of the second period, and the layoff decision is made at the 
beginning of the second period. The firm cannot commit at the beginning 
of the first period to pay a particular second-period wage or to make a 
particular  second-period layoff decision, whether or not the wage or layoff 
decision is contingent on first-period output. Once the second period ar- 
rives, however, the firm chooses  to pay wages and make layoff decisions 
that depend on output (i.e., ability),  as described below. Since there are 
no contingent or long-term contracts, firms have no way to offer insurance, 
so it is immaterial whether workers are risk neutral or risk averse. 
The assumption that contracts contingent on output cannot be enforced 
fits naturally with our assumption that output is not observable by pro- 
spective employers (and so plausibly also is unobservable to a court). The 
assumption that long-term contracts cannot be enforced seems natural 
because of the possibility that firm-specific productivity shocks may occur: 
if a bad enough shock occurs at the beginning of period 2, the current 
employer will go bankrupt rather than live up to the contract. (Our em- 
pirical focus on permanently displaced workers is consistent with  pro- 
ductivity shocks playing an important role.) More generally, both of these 
assumptions are in keeping with the view that output and compensation 
are complex, multidimensional quantities that are difficult to specify in a 
4 See Heckman and Honore (1990) and Caplin and Nalebuff (1991)  for proofs 
of this result. We assume log concavity for two reasons. First, it greatly simplifies 
several derivations (but weaker assumptions would also be sufficient; see Caplin 
and Nalebuff). Second, although the predictions we examine in our empirical work 
do not depend on log concavity, we find that one's intuitive grasp of the model is 
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contract: output can be produced under favorable or unfavorable circum- 
stances and can be of high or low quality; compensation includes not only 
wages but working conditions and task assignments. 
4)  Timing.-The  crux of the model is the sequence of events between 
the two periods. After observing a given worker's first-period output, the 
current employer decides whether to lay off the worker. If the worker is 
laid off, then the current employer has no further contact with the worker. 
In particular,  there is no possibility of recall. Following a layoff, prospective 
employers observe that the worker was laid off and then simultaneously 
offer the worker a second-period wage. The worker accepts the highest 
wage offered (randomizing in case of a tie).  If the current employer does 
not lay off the worker, however, then the following  wage-setting game 
ensues. First, prospective employers observe that the worker was not laid 
off by the first-period employer. Second, prospective employers simulta- 
neously offer the worker a second-period wage. Third, the current  employer 
observes the offers from prospective employers and then makes its own 
second-period wage offer to the worker. Finally, the worker chooses the 
highest of the wages offered (choosing the current employer's offer in case 
of a tie), except that with probability  pu  the worker is constrained  to move- 
in order to accompany a spouse, for example-and  so accepts the highest 
offer from the market (randomizing among tied offers). 
Our model of layoffs and wage-setting integrates two  leading models 
from the literature:  the adverse-selection model developed by Greenwald 
and the signaling model developed by Waldman. There are two  major 
differences between these models. First, Greenwald assumes that the mar- 
ket's second-period wage offer to a worker the firm does not lay off equals 
the worker's expected ability conditional on the worker choosing to accept 
the market's offer rather than the firm's. Waldman, in contrast, assumes 
that the market's offer is the (unconditional)  expectation of the worker's 
ability. In the terminology of auction theory, Greenwald allows for the 
winner s curse, while Waldman assumes it away.5 Second, Greenwald as- 
sumes that the firm has no opportunity to signal its private information, 
whereas Waldman does allow the firm to signal (through job assignments 
rather than through layoffs as here). 
Our model has a continuum of equilibria, ranging from an equilibrium 
analogous to the unique equilibrium in Greenwald's model to an equilib- 
rium analogous to  the unique equilibrium in Waldman's model. All  of 
these equilibria  formalize the intuition given at the beginning of this section: 
5The winner's  curse  arises  in an  auction  when  the  good  being  sold has  a common 
value  to all the bidders  (such  as an oil field)  and  each  bidder  has  a privately  known 
unbiased  estimate  of the value  of the good (such as from  a geologist's  report):  the 
winning  bidder  will be the one who most  overestimated  the  value  of t~he  good;  this 
bidder's  estimate  itself  may  be unbiased  but  the estimate  conditional  on the knowl- 
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if the firm lays off any one at all, it lays off its least productive workers; 
the market infers that laid-off workers are of low productivity and so offers 
them a low wage; assuming that no such negative inference is warranted 
after a plant closing, laid-off workers thus earn lower reemployment wages 
than do workers displaced by plant closings. In addition to formalizing 
the intuition we subsequently study in our empirical work, our equilibria 
also shed new light on the results  of and the relation between the Greenwald 
and Waldman models. See the discussion at the end of this section. 
B.  Computing the Equilibria 
We use the following notation to describe the players' (pure) strategies. 
Let L(i)  represent the firm's layoff decision for a worker of  ability rj: 
L(n)  =  1 if the current employer lays off a worker with ability rj; L(n) 
=  0 if the firm does not lay off such a worker. Let Wmi(L) denote the wage 
offer made by the ith prospective employer if the current employer lays 
off a worker; let Wmi(R)  denote the analogous offer in the event that the 
firm attempts to retain (i.e., does not lay off)  the worker. It suffices to 
consider a market of  two  prospective employers, denoted by i  =  1, 2. 
Finally, let wf[fl,  Wmi1 (R),  Wm2(R)]  be the wage the firm offers to a worker 
whom  it  did  not  lay off,  given  that the worker's ability is rj and the 
offers the worker has received from prospective employers are Wi(R) 
and Wm2(R). 
To construct an equilibrium in our model, we work backwards.  We first 
compute the firm's optimal wage offer to a worker it did not lay off, given 
the worker's ability and the offers made by prospective employers. We 
then compute the market's optimal wage offer to a worker who was not 
laid off, given that the firm's subsequent offer will be the best response 
just derived and given the market's conjecture about the layoff rule used 
by the firm. Finally, we compute the firm's optimal layoff rule, given that 
the subsequent wage offers will be the best responses just derived. In equi- 
librium, the firm's chosen layoff rule must be identical to the market's 
conjecture6 
Consider a worker who  was not laid off. Let w.  denote the worker's 
best offer from the market (hereafter also called the market wage):  wm 
6 We have just (loosely)  defined a perfect Bayesian (or,  roughly, sequential) 
equilibrium of our signaling game. See Kreps and Wilson (1982)  and Fudenberg 
and Tirole (1991) for more precise definitions of these equilibrium concepts. In 
many signaling games one must strengthen the equilibrium concept so as to rule 
out equilibria that rely on unreasonable beliefs off the equilibrium path; see, e.g., 
Cho and Kreps (1987). The signal space in our model, however, includes only two 
possible signals: whether or not the worker is laid off. Furthermore, in all but one 
of the equilibria  we describe  below, both signals are used (with positive probability), 
in which  case it  is neither necessary nor feasible to strengthen the equilibrium 
concept by restricting beliefs off the equilibrium path. 358  Gibbons/Katz 
=  max{wmI(R),  Wm2(R)}.  If  the  worker's  ability  satisfies  rj +  s  ?  w  ,, 
the firm's best response is to try to retain the worker by offering the market 
wage, in which  case the worker remains with  the firm for the second 
period with probability 1 -  ,u but is constrained to move with probability 
,u. If  the  worker's  ability  satisfies  rj +  s  < w?,,  however,  the  firm's  best 
response is to offer less than the market  wage, in which case with probability 
one the worker leaves the firm to accept a higher second-period wage offer 
from a new employer. 
In equilibrium, prospective employers anticipate that the firm will play 
the best response just derived. In order to compute their optimal wage 
offers, prospective employers must also have a conjecture about the layoff 
rule used by the firm. Suppose that prospective employers believe that the 
firm lays off a worker if and only if the worker's ability is less than some 
cutoff, rR.  Then Bertrand  wage competition among prospective employers 
bids up the second-period wage the market offers to workers who are not 
laid off until the market  earns  zero expected profit on the workers it attracts 
with this offer. That is, Wm  satisfies 
o =  g  [E(  fl  2  ?  T1R) -  Wm]  +  (1  -  g)prob{  +  s < waIs  ?  fljR} 
X  [E(1]I1]?  <1  <  Wm  S)  Wm] 
because prospective employers understand that with  probability pu  the 
worker will be constrained to move and so will accept wn independent of 
the offer received from the firm but that with probability 1 -  pu  the worker 
will not be constrained to move and so will accept Wm  only if it exceeds 
the  wage  offer  received  from  the  firm  (i.e.,  only  if 1] < Wm -  s,  given  the 
firm's best response derived above).  We show  in the Appendix that for 
each of the relevant values of nR,  (1)  has a unique solution. 
In equilibrium, the firm anticipates that the subsequent market wage 
offer will be wv,, the solution to (1),  and so understands that it will find 
it unprofitable to employ a worker of ability satisfying rj + s <  wv,. The 
firm is indifferent between the two ways it can rid itself of such a worker: 
it can lay off the worker, or it can induce the worker to quit by offering 
less than the market wage. Thus, provided that flR  +  S <  Win, one of the 
firm's optimal layoff rules is to lay off a worker if ri <  rR  and to induce 
the worker to quit if flR <  1]  <  Wm -  s. If the firm chooses this rule, then 
the market's conjecture we assumed above is correct. Thus, we have con- 
structed (most of) an equilibrium, provided flR satisfies 
11R  +  S <  WM,  (2) 
where wm,  is in turn a function of flR as described by (1). 
We show in the Appendix that (2)  holds provided flR <  r *,  where r * 
is the unique solution to Layoffs and Lemons  359 
11* + s = E(llrlq  2  *).  (3) 
To complete the description of equilibrium, it remains only to specify the 
equilibrium  behavior  by prospective employers if the firm lays off a worker: 
Bertrand wage  competition  yields  a  second-period  wage  equal to  the 
worker's expected ability. If prospective employers believe that the firm 
lays off a worker if and only if the worker's ability is less than rjR, then 
the reemployment wage of a laid-off worker will be 
W2  (L) = E(rJ  I  il <  OR).  (4) 
Since rlR <  1l  *  < llH,  we have that w2(L) < E(rj).7 
For workers who lose their jobs because of a plant closing, in contrast, 
we  assume that no adverse inference about ability is warranted, so that 
competition among prospective employers yields the reemployment wage 
w2(PC)  =  E(rj).  (5) 
Comparing (4)  and (5)  shows that W2(PC)  >  W2(L). This inequality is 
the main prediction of our model: the reemployment wages of laid-off 
workers  are less  than  those  of  (otherwise  observationally equivalent) 
workers displaced by plant closings. In our empirical work we consider 
wage changes as well as reemployment wages. In our model, competition 
among employers and the symmetric information before period 1 yield a 
single first-period wage wi for all workers, independent of ability. There- 
fore, the wage changes experienced by displaced workers satisfy W2(PC) 
-  w1>  w2(L)  -  wi. 
To  conclude  this section, we  describe some of  the properties of  our 
continuum of equilibria  parameterized  by rR,  and we relate these equilibria 
to the Greenwald and Waldman equilibria. First, rj  * in (3)  decreases with 
s. (To  see this, implicitly differentiate [3] and use the fact that d{E(,q In 
2  ?  *)}/dr  *  <  1.) In the limits, q * approaches flL as s approaches E(r1) 
-rlL  and approaches flH  as s approaches zero. These results follow  from 
the fact that-as  in any lemons problem, from Akerlof (1970)  on-the 
current employer considers the productivity (in that firm) of the marginal 
retained worker, while  prospective employers consider the productivity 
(in their firms) of the average retained worker. Some level of firm-specific 
human capital (s > 0) is necessary for these two productivities to be equal. 
Second, flL  and rj  * are independent of ,u. Thus, the range of layoff rates 
associated with our continuum of equilibria (i.e., F(r)R),  for rlR ranging 
7 We show in the Appendix  that  any  equilibrium,  including  those  not belonging 
to the continuum  of equilibria  we have  just described,  yields the qualitative  con- 
clusion  that  W2(L)  < E(n). 360  Gibbons/Katz 
from iL to r *) is independent of A. The range of quit rates associated with 
these equilibria does vary with ,u, however, and also varies inversely with 
the layoff rate: the maximal quit rate occurs when the layoff rate is zero 
(i.e., when  l]R  =  ilL)  and the minimal quit rate (namely, A) occurs when 
the layoff rate is maximal (i.e., when l]R  =  1  *) 
Third, as described above, our equilibria range from an equilibrium 
analogous to Waldman's (namely,  ]R  =  r *,  in which Wm  =  E(l  1] ?  2R)- 
there is no winner's curse) to an equilibrium analogous to Greenwald's 
(namely, Y1R  =  rL,  in which turnover vanishes as g approaches zero). The 
higher the ability of the most able laid-off worker (namely,  ]R),  the weaker 
the winner's curse the market suffers when it makes a second-period wage 
offer to a worker the firm does not lay off (in  the sense that this wage 
offer becomes closer to the unconditional expectation of the worker's abil- 
ity).  One  interpretation of  these equilibria is that we  relax Waldman's 
assumption that the winner's curse is absent but show that the assumption 
holds in one of  the limiting equilibria (and is approximately correct in 
nearby equilibria). A  second interpretation is that we  allow  the ability 
distribution in Greenwald's model to be determined endogenously by the 
firm's layoff decision and show that even if pu  is arbitrarily  small (as casual 
reflection suggests it might be) there exist equilibria in which  turnover 
does not vanish: the layoff rate can be as high as F(,q *),  independent of 
,u. Under either interpretation, however, our main result is that in all the 
equilibria the reemployment wages of laid-off workers are low. We turn 
next to an empirical investigation of this prediction. 
III.  Empirical  Analysis  of the  Wages of Displaced  Workers 
In this section, we  provide evidence on  the wages of  male displaced 
workers, 8 using data from the January 1984 and January 1986 Displaced 
Workers Supplements (DWS) to the Current Population Survey.9  We ex- 
amine how the change in wages, the predisplacement wage, and the post- 
8 We focus on males  displaced  from full-time  jobs in an attempt  to identify  a 
sample  of workers  with strong  attachments  to the labor  market.  This allows  us to 
focus  on the  impact  of the  lemons  effect  on wages  alone  rather  than  jointly  modeling 
the impact  on labor-force  participation. 
9 Workers  in the January  1984 DWS permanently  lost a lob between  January 
1979  and  January  1984.  Workers  in the  January  1986  DWS  permanently  lost a job 
between  January  1981  and  January  1986.  Individuals  enter  the DWS if they lost a 
job in the 5 years  prior  to the survey  because  of a plant  closing,  an employer  going 
out of business,  or a layoff from which he or she was not recalled.  Interviewers 
for the DWS were instructed  that,  if an individual  was fired  from  a job for cause, 
then  the individual  should  not be included  in the DWS.  If a worker  lost more  than 
one job in the 5 years  prior  to the survey,  the survey  questions  refer  to the lost job 
he or she had held the longest. See U.S. Department  of Commerce  (1986) for 
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displacement wage vary with the cause of displacement and with predis- 
placement occupation. 
Both our model and our data concern layoffs and plant closings. Existing 
work has focused on the distinction between quits (voluntary separations) 
and layoffs (involuntary separations). Bartel and Borjas  ( 1981  ) and Mincer 
(1986),  for example, find that quitters typically experience wage increases 
while laid-off workers typically experience wage losses. This fact suggests 
that a laid-off worker might try to escape the lemons inference described 
in our model by claiming to have quit rather than admit to having been 
laid off. Similarly, a laid-off worker could claim to have been displaced by 
a plant closing. We assume that plant closings are not only widely observed 
but also verifiable. Thus, a personnel officer could check an applicant's 
claim concerning a plant closing. Likewise, we assume that a personnel 
officer could check an applicant's claim concerning current or previous 
employment. 
A.  Data Description 
We examine a pooled sample of male workers between the ages of 20 
and 61 who were permanently displaced from a private-sector, full-time, 
nonagricultural job because of a plant closing, slack work, or a position 
or shift that was eliminated; we classify as layoffs those displaced because 
of slack work or a position or shift that was eliminated. Workers displaced 
from construction jobs were eliminated from the sample since it is difficult 
to formulate an appropriate definition of permanent displacement from a 
construction job. For most of this section, the sample is restricted to those 
individuals who were reemployed in wage and salary employment 10  at the 
survey date and who had reemployment earnings of at least $40 a week; 
at the end of the section, we address the potential sample-selection bias 
arising from the fact that we exclude from the sample workers not reem- 
ployed at the survey date. 
Basic descriptive statistics for our sample of displaced workers are pre- 
sented in table 1. The sample is approximately evenly split between those 
displaced through plant closings and those displaced by layoffs. The vast 
majority (79%) of those whom  we classify as displaced by layoffs were 
displaced because of slack work. The major measured difference between 
workers displaced by plant closings and those displaced by layoffs is that, 
on average,  the former had been on their predisplacement  jobs substantially 
longer (2.2 more years). This suggests that seniority rules may be important 
in layoff decisions. Other measured differences between workers displaced 
by plant closings and those displaced by layoffs are, on average,  the former 
have shorter spells of joblessness following  displacement, are more likely 
10  Unfortunately,  the CPS does not provide  current  earnings  information  for 
those  workers  who entered  self-employment. 362  Gibbons/Katz 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Displaced Workers  Data Set from January 1984 
and 1986 CPS Displaced Workers  Surveys, Males Reemployed 
at Survey Date in Wage and Salary Employment 
Means 
Reason for 
Displacement 
Variable  Entire Sample  Plant Closing  Layoff* 
Layoff=  1  .53  .00  1.00 
Previous tenure in years  4.73  5.87  3.72 
(6.00)  (7.03)  (4.68) 
Change in log real weekly earnings  -.164  -.160  -.168 
(.50)  (.49)  (.51) 
Log of previous weekly earnings  5.94  5.94  5.93 
(.49)  (.49)  (.48) 
Log of current weekly earnings  5.77  5.78  5.76 
(.54)  (.54)  (.48) 
Weeks of Ioblessness after displacement  21.35  19.61  22.89 
(25.71)  (25.21)  (26.05) 
No  unemployment after displacement 
=  1  .14  .19  .10 
Advance notification of displacement =  1  .51  .56  .47 
Years of schooling  12.62  12.41  12.81 
(2.40)  (2.46)  (2.33) 
(Age -  education -  6) at displacement  12.38  13.67  11.23 
(10.33)  (10.85)  (9.71) 
White  collar  in previous  job = 1  .34  .34  .35 
Previous  job  in manufacturing  = 1  .53  .51  .54 
N  3,427  1,614  1,813 
NOTE.-Standard  deviations  are  in parentheses.  All  weekly  earnings  figures  are  deflated  by  the  gross 
national  product  (GNP)  deflator.  * Reason  for  displacement  was  slack  work  or  elimination  of shift  or  position. 
to have found new jobs without  an intervening spell of unemployment, 
and are more likely to have received advance notification of job loss. 
The earnings loss for the typical displaced worker in the sample is sub- 
stantial. The mean change in the log of real weekly earnings is -0.16  for 
the whole  sample and does not differ much between those displaced by 
plant closings and those displaced by layoffs. Much evidence indicates, 
however, that the earnings losses of displaced workers rise substantially 
with  predisplacement tenure (e.g.,  Podgursky and Swaim 1987; Kletzer 
1989; and Topel  1991). Thus, the fact that the earnings losses of workers 
displaced by layoffs and by plant closings are similar despite the higher 
average  predisplacement  tenure  of those displaced  by plant closings suggests 
that a lemons effect may be operating. 
The information content of a layoff depends on whether the employer 
has any discretion with respect to whom to lay off. In the presence of a 
layoff-by-seniority rule, for example, there may be little or no information 
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off. Most jobs covered by collective-bargaining agreements are governed 
by layoff-by-seniority rules, but many nonunion jobs are not governed by 
such rules.1' This suggests examining whether the gap between the wage 
losses from layoffs versus those from plant closings is larger in subsamples 
where employers are likely to have more discretion with respect to whom 
to lay off.12 
Because many fewer white- than blue-collar jobs are covered by collec- 
tive-bargaining agreements,13  we  presume that the degree of  discretion 
over whom  to lay off is likely to be higher in white- than in blue-collar 
jobs. Differences in the characteristics and displacement experiences of 
displaced workers by cause of displacement are presented separately for 
white- and blue-collar workers in table 2. The difference in average pre- 
displacement tenure between workers displaced by plant closings and those 
displaced by layoffs is significantly smaller for white-collar workers than 
it is for blue-collar workers (1.3 vs. 2.6 years). This suggests that strict 
layoff-by-seniority rules are less important and employer discretion is more 
important for layoff decisions concerning white-collar workers than for 
those involving blue-collar workers.'4 The significantly lower fraction of 
white- than of blue-collar layoff victims who received advance notification 
11 Abraham and Medoff (1984),  for instance, find that (1)  92% of union firms 
have written rules to deal with  permanent layoffs while only  24% of nonunion 
firms have such written layoff policies, and that (2)  58% of nonunion firms have 
a practice of  sometimes laying off a more senior worker if a junior worker is 
believed to be worth more on net, as compared to 17%  of union employers. 
12 Unfortunately, the Displaced Workers  Supplements  do not provide information 
on whether a worker's predisplacement job was covered by a collective-bargaining 
agreement. 
13 We used all 12 outgoing rotation groups from the 1983 Current Population 
Survey to tabulate unionization rates by occupation for a sample of workers com- 
parable to our DWS sample. We included in our sample 20-61-year-old, male, full- 
time, private-sector  employees not working in agriculture  or construction. Workers 
were classified as unionized if they were union members and/or  working in em- 
ployment  covered by a collective-bargaining agreement. We find that 10.4% of 
white-collar workers were unionized, compared to 38.5% of blue-collar workers; 
see table 3 for the mapping from one-digit occupations to these white-collar and 
blue-collar aggregates. 
14 We also computed the difference in average predisplacement tenure between 
workers displaced by plant closings and those displaced by layoffs for one-digit 
predisplacement  occupations rather  than for our white- and blue-collar  occupational 
aggregates.  Among white-collar workers, the average  difference in tenure (in years) 
is: managers and administrators =  1.4, professional and technical workers =  1.6, 
clerical workers =  1.2, and sales workers =  1.2. Among blue-collar workers, the 
average (in years) is: craft and kindred workers = 2.7, operatives (except in trans- 
portation) =  2.8, transport operatives =  2.2, laborers =  3.1, and service workers 
=  1.4. Thus, with the exception of service workers, the white- vs. and blue-collar 
division of the sample closely matches the division of the sample in terms of this 
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Table  2 
Descriptive Statistics by Broad Occupation from January 1984 and 1986 
CPS Displaced Workers  Surveys, Ma1es  Reemployed at Survey Data 
in Wage and Salary Employment 
Means 
White Collar  Blue Collar 
Variable  Plant Closing  Layoff*  Plant Closing  Layoff* 
Previous tenure in years  5.17  3.84  6.23  3.66 
(.28)  (.20)  (.22)  (.13) 
Change in log real weekly earnings  -.068  -.125  -.208  -.191 
(.02)  (.02)  (.02)  (.02) 
Log of previous weekly earnings  6.06  6.05  5.88  5.87 
(.02)  (.02)  (.01)  (.01) 
Log of current weekly earnings  5.99  5.93  5.67  5.68 
(.02)  (.02)  (.02)  (.02) 
Weeks of joblessness after 
displacement  13.96  18.36  22.54  25.29 
(.84)  (.85)  (.84)  (.81) 
No  unemployment after 
displacement =  1  .25  .11  .16  .09 
(.02)  (.01)  (.01)  (.01) 
Advance notification of 
displacement =  1  .55  .41  .56  .51 
(.02)  (.02)  (.02)  (.01) 
Years of schooling  13.87  14.21  11.65  12.07 
(.10)  (.09)  (.06)  (.06) 
(Age -  education -  6) at 
displacement  13.04  11.82  13.99  10.92 
(.44)  (.40)  (.34)  (.28) 
Previous  job in manufacturing 
=  1  .35  .39  .60  .62 
N  552  627  1,062  1,186 
NOTE.-Standard  errors  of the means  are  in parentheses.  The white-collar  sample  consists  of workers 
with predisplacement  jobs  as managers  and administrators,  professional  and technical  workers,  clerical 
workers,  or sales  workers.  The blue-collar  sample  consists  of workers  with predisplacement  jobs  as craft 
and  kindred  workers,  operatives,  laborers,  transport  operatives,  or service  workers.  Weekly  earnings  figures 
are  deflated  by the GNP deflator. 
* Reason  for displacement  was slack  work  or elimination  of shift  or position. 
of displacement (0.41 vs. 0.51) also suggests that white-collar layoffs are 
less likely  to be governed  by collective-bargaining  agreements,  which  often 
include  formal  prenotification  requirements  and formally  limit employer 
choice with respect  to whom to lay off. 
Table  2 also reveals  that the pattern  of (raw) earnings  losses  for white- 
collar  workers  fits the predictions  of our model:  predisplacement  earnings 
do not differ  much  by cause  of displacement,  while  postdisplacement  earn- 
ings are significantly  lower (by 6%) for those displaced  by layoffs.  Fur- 
thermore,  for blue-collar  workers the analogous  difference  in postdis- 
placement earnings is not significantly  different  from zero, again as 
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Table  3 
Coefficients  on  Layoff  Dummy  in Earnings  Equations  from  January  1984 
and  1986 CPS Displaced  Workers  Surveys,  Males Reemployed 
at Survey  Date 
Dependent  Variable* 
Wage  Change  Predisplacement  Postdisplacement 
Sample  N  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Whole sample  3,427  -.040  .017  -.021 
(.017)  (.014)  (.017) 
White collar  1,179  -.055  -.0094  -.064 
(.028)  (.024)  (.029) 
Blue collar  2,248  -.024  .022  .0023 
(.022)  (.017)  (.021) 
Low union  1,716  -.040  -.007  -.046 
(.023)  (.020)  (.024) 
High union  1,711  -.031  .030  .002 
(.026)  (.020)  (.004) 
NOTE.-The  reported  regressions  include  a spline  function  in previous  tenure  (with  breaks  at 1,  2, 3, 
and  6  years),  education,  a  dummy  for  advance  notification  of  dis lacement,  year-of-displacement  dummies, 
seven  previous-industry  dummies,  eight  previous-occupation  dummies,  experience  (age  -  education  -  6) 
and  its  square,  a marriage  dummy,  a nonwhite  dummy,  and  three  region  dummies.  Columns  I and  3 also 
include  years  since  displacement.  The  white-collar  sample  consists  of workers  with  predisplacement  jobs 
as  managers  and  administrators,  professional  and  technical  workers,  clerical  workers,  or sales  workers. 
The  blue-collar  sample  consists  of workers  with  predisplacement  jobs  as  craft  and  kindred  workers,  op- 
eratives,  laborers,  transport  operatives,  or  service  workers.  The  low-union  sample  consists  of workers  in 
industry-occupation  cells  with  unionization  rates  of less  than  25.5%  in 1983;  all workers  in industry- 
occupation  ce  ls with  hi  gher  unionization  rates  are  in  the  high-union  sample.  Earnings  are  deflated  by  the 
GNP  deflator.  The  num  ers  in  parentheses  are  standard  errors. 
*  Dependent  variable:  col. I = log  (current  wage/previous  wage);  col.  2 = log  (previous  wage);  col.  3 
= log  (current  wage). 
B.  Earnings Equations 
The raw earnings changes suggest that some stigma is attached to being 
laid off when employers are likely to be able to pick whom to lay off but 
that no stigma is attached to being laid off from jobs where formal rules 
are more likely to govern layoff decisions. To continue to assess the em- 
pirical support for the predictions of our model, we present estimates in 
table 3 of the coefficient on a layoff dummy in regressions of (i) the change 
in earnings;  (ii) predisplacement earnings;  and (iii) postdisplacement earn- 
ings  on  a standard set  of  worker  characteristics, year-of-displacement 
dummies, region dummies, a dummy variable for advance notification of 
displacement,  and  one-digit  predisplacement occupation  and  industry 
dummies.  5 
The estimates for the whole sample presented in table 3 provide some 
support for the model's basic prediction: the estimate in column 1 reveals 
that workers displaced through layoffs experience approximately  4% larger 
wage reductions than do workers with the same measured  predisplacement 
15 The wage-change  and  postdisplacement  earnings  equations  also include  years 
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characteristics  who were displaced in plant closings. This effect is perhaps 
stronger than it might appear  because it is net of two effects in the opposite 
direction: first, workers involved in plant closings seem more likely to be 
located in distressed local labor markets, and, second, many of the layoffs 
in the sample are likely to have been determined by strict seniority systems. 
Columns 2 and 3 reveal, however, that the estimate in column  1 arises 
both  from  the  slightly  higher predisplacement earnings and from  the 
slightly  lower  postdisplacement earnings of  those  displaced by layoffs. 
Our model predicts only the lower postdisplacement earnings. 
Separate estimates of the effect of cause of displacement on the wage 
changes of white-  and blue-collar workers are also presented in table 3. 
Among white-collar workers, reemployment earnings are estimated to be 
more than 6% lower for those displaced by layoffs than for those displaced 
by plant closings; no similar difference is apparent  for blue-collar workers. 
Thus, for white-collar workers there is fairly strong evidence supporting 
the lemons effect. 
An alternative  approach to determining whether workers were displaced 
from jobs that were likely to be governed by formal layoff-by-seniority 
rules is to classify workers by the likelihood  that their predisplacement 
jobs were unionized.  Since the DWS  does not  provide information on 
whether a worker's predisplacement job was unionized, we used the extent 
of unionization in a worker's predisplacement industry-occupation cell to 
determine whether the worker's predisplacement job was likely to be cov- 
ered by a collective-bargaining  agreement.  We used all 12 outgoing rotation 
groups from the 1983 Current Population Survey (the full-year sample) 
to generate a sample of workers comparable to our DWS sample and then 
to compute unionization rates for white- and blue-collar workers in each 
three-digit industry (as defined in the 1980 Census of Population).16 We 
then classified workers into high- and low-union  subsamples depending 
on whether their predisplacement industry-occupation cell had a union- 
ization rate above or below the sample median rate of 25.5%. The mean 
unionization rates in the high- and low-union  subsamples are 50.3% and 
9.7%, respectively. 
Estimates of the effect of cause of displacement on the earnings of work- 
ers by unionization class are presented in the last two rows of table 3. The 
layoff coefficients for the low-union sample are qualitatively similar to but 
not as large as the analogous coefficients for the white-collar sample. In 
16 Unionization  rates  were computed  for 420 industry-occupation  cells using  a 
210-industry  by two-occupation  (i.e., white-  and  blue-collar)  classification  scheme. 
The sample  was restricted  to 20-61-year-old,  male, full-time,  private-sector  em- 
ployees  not working  in agriculture  or construction.  The  sample  consisted  of 53,972 
observations  satisfying  these  criteria.  Workers  were  classified  as unionized  if they 
were  union  members  and/or employed  in a job covered  by a collective-bargaining 
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particular,  the reemployment earnings of low-union workers displaced by 
layoffs are estimated to be approximately 4.5% lower than are those of 
low-union  workers displaced by plant closings, while no such gap is ap- 
parent in the high-union sample. 
In sum, the estimates in table 3 are consistent with the view that the 
information content  of  a layoff is greater where employers have more 
discretion over whom to lay off. According to (a simple extension of) our 
model, however, the information content of a layoff also should be greater 
where employers have better information about workers' abilities. Since 
some time may have to elapse before the current employer can accurately 
evaluate a worker's ability (perhaps because the employer is unable to 
learn the worker's ability until the worker learns the job), it may be that 
layoffs after brief employment spells signal little information to prospective 
employers. To  study this possibility,  we  explored whether the lemons 
effect associated with  layoffs differs for workers with  more versus less 
predisplacement job tenure. We reestimated the regressions in rows  1-3 
of table 3 after replacing the layoff dummy with two interactions between 
the layoff dummy and two predisplacement  tenure dummies-a  low-tenure 
dummy for predisplacement tenure less than 2 years and a high-tenure 
dummy for predisplacement tenure of at least 2 years. The results of these 
regressions are presented in table 4.17 
The estimates in table 4 reveal that the effect of a layoff (vs. a plant 
closing)  on a displaced worker's wages varies substantially with predis- 
placement tenure. For the whole  sample and for white-  and blue-collar 
workers considered separately, workers with less than 2 years of tenure 
experience essentially no (statistically significant) differential effect from 
a layoff. Not surprisingly, therefore, the estimates for workers with at least 
2 years of tenure are amplified versions of the estimates that do not allow 
for tenure differences (presented in table 3). For high-tenure white-collar 
workers, for example, the extra loss in postdisplacement  earnings  following 
a layoff rather than a plant closing is 8.2% rather than the 6.4% for all 
white-collar workers reported in table 3. As before, the analogous loss for 
high-tenure blue-collar workers is zero, as is the influence of a layoff on 
the predisplacement earnings of high-tenure white-collar workers. Unlike 
in table 3, however, the influence of a layoff on the  predisplacement  earnings 
of high-tenure blue-collar workers is now (a statistically significant) 4% 
rather than (an insignificant) 2%. 
17 We  also  computed  the  analogous  estimates  using  low- and  high-tenure  dummies 
defined  as less than and at least 1 year of predisplacement  tenure,  respectively. 
Because  the sample  of such low-tenure  workers  is extremely  small,  the estimates 
for the low-tenure  subsample  are quite  imprecise  and the estimates  for the high- 
tenure  subsample  are  very  similar  to the estimates  for the whole sample  presented 
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Table 4 
Coefficients  on Interaction of Layoff Dummy with Low- and High- 
Tenure Dummies in Earnings Equations from January 1984 and 1986 
CPS Displaced Workers Surveys, Males Reemployed at Survey Date 
Dependent  Variable* 
Wage  Change Predisplacement  Postdisplacement 
Sample  N  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Whole sample:  3,427 
Layoff  dummy 
X low-tenure  dummy  -.011  -.022  -.031 
(.030)  (.024)  (.029) 
Layoff  dummy 
X high-tenure  dummy  -.054  .036  -.016 
(.021)  (.017)  (.021) 
White  collar:  1,179 
Layoff  dummy 
X low-tenure  dummy  .011  -.038  -.026 
(.047)  (.042)  (.050) 
Layoff  dummy 
X high-tenure  dummy  -.087  .004  -.082 
(.033)  (.029)  (.035) 
Blue  collar:  2,248 
Layoff  dummy 
X low-tenure  dummy  -.0 10  -.020  -.027 
(.038)  (.030)  (.037) 
Layoff  dummy 
X low-tenure  dummy  -.030  .043  .017 
(.027)  (.02  1)  (.026) 
NOTE.-Low  tenure  = less  than  2 years  of tenure  on  predisplacement  job;  high  tenure  = at  least  2 years 
of tenure  on predisplacement  job.  The  reported  regressions  include  a spline  function  in previous  tenure 
(with  breaks  at 1,  2, 3, and  6 years),  education,  a dummy  for  advance  notification  of displacement,  year- 
of-displacement  dummies,  seven  previous-industry  dummies,  eight  previous-occupation  dummies,  experience 
(age  - education  -  6)  and  its  square,  a marriage  dummy,  a nonwhite  dummy,  and  three  region  du  mmies. 
Columns  1  and  3 also  include  years  since  displacement.  The  white-collar  sample  consists  of workers  with 
predisplacement  jobs  as  managers  and  administrators,  professional  and  technical  workers,  clerical  workers, 
or  sales  workers.  The  blue-coltar  sample  consists  of  workers  with  predisplacement  jobs  as  craft  and  kindred 
workers,  operatives,  laborers,  transport  operatives,  or  service  workers.  Earnings  are  deflated  by  the  GNP 
deflator.  The  numbers  in parentheses  are  standard  errors. 
* Dependent  variable:  col. I = log  (current  wage/previous  wage);  col.  2 = log  (previous  wage);  col.  3 
= log  (current  wage). 
C.  Sensitivity Analyses 
Since the equations presented in table 3 were estimated on the sample 
of displaced workers who were reemployed at the survey date, the estimates 
potentially reflect sample-selection bias. We have taken two  approaches 
to probe the importance of this problem. First, we reestimated the models 
presented in table 3 using the two-stage sample--selection  bias correction 
approach  of Heckman (1979).8  The Heckit estimates of the layoff-dummy 
18 The reemployment  probit  equations  in the first  stage  of the Heckit  procedure 
were estimated  on our basic  sample  plus displaced  males  who were unemployed, 
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Table  5 
Coefficients  on  Layoff  Dummy  in Earnings  Equations  from  January  1984 
and  1986 CPS Displaced  Workers  Surveys,  Males Displaced  at Least 2 
Years before  the  Survey  Date  and Reemployed  at the Survey  Date 
Dependent  Variable* 
Wage  Change  Predisplacement  Postdisplacement 
Sample  N  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Whole sample  1,875  -.017  .0028  -.013 
(.030)  (.019)  (.023) 
White collar  602  -.047  -.030  -.075 
(.039)  (.034)  (.040) 
Blue collar  1,273  .0081  .013  .021 
(.030)  (.024)  (.028) 
NOTE.-The  reported  regressions  include  a spline  function  in previous  tenure  (with  breaks  at 1,  2, 3, 
and  6  years),  education,  a  dummy  for  advance  notification  of  displacement,  year-of-displacement  dummies, 
seven  previous-industry  dummies,  eight  previous-occupation  uummies,  experience  (age  - education  -  6) 
and  its  square,  a marriage  dummy,  a nonwhite  dummy,  and  three  region  dummies.  Columns  I and  3 also 
include  years  since  displacement.  The  white-collar  sample  consists  of workers  with  predisplacement  jobs 
as managers  and  administrators,  professional  and  technical  workers,  clerical  workers,  or sales  workers. 
The  blue-collar  sample  consists  of workers  with  predisplacement  jobs  as  craft  and  kindred  workers,  op- 
eratives,  laborers,  transport  operatives,  or  service  workers.  Earnings  are  deflated  by  the  GNP  deflator.  The 
numbers  in  parentheses  are  standard  errors. 
* Dependent  variable:  col. I = log  (current  wage/previous  wage);  col.  2 = log  (previous  wage);  col.  3 
= log  (current  wage). 
coefficient are similar to the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates pre- 
sented in table 3 in all cases. For example, the Heckit  estimates of the 
layoff-dummy coefficients for white-collar workers are -0.055  in the wage 
change equation, -0.0093  in the predisplacement earnings equation, and 
-0.064  in the postdisplacement earnings equation. 
As a second approach to the sample-selection problem, we examined 
the subsample of workers who were displaced at least 2 years prior to the 
survey date. These workers have had a substantial amount of time to find 
a new job. Also, the effects of short-lived bad matches and temporary jobs 
after displacement should be reduced. Estimates of the layoff coefficient 
for this subsample of displaced workers are presented in table 5. The layoff 
effects for white-collar workers displaced at least 2 years before the survey 
date are similar to the analogous effects for the entire white-collar sample, 
and the findings for the whole sample and for blue-collar workers are in 
the spirit of the analogous results in table 3. 
In addition to sample-selection bias, a second potential bias arises  because 
The reemployment  probits  included  the same  variables  as the independent  variables 
in the wage  regressions  in table  3. Since  we could  not make  a convincing  exclusion 
restriction  (i.e., identify  a variable  that affects  the probability  of reemployment  at 
the survey  date  but  does  not affect  earnings),  the Heckit  models  are  identified  only 
by the nonlinearity  of the sample-selection  bias  correction  term  (the inverse  Mills 
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the DWS asks respondents about events that occurred as long as 5 years 
prior to the survey date. Thus, some respondents may have either com- 
pletely forgotten events that occurred in the distant past or remembered 
such events but misreported the dates at which they occurred, or both. 
Robert Topel has alerted us to one possible manifestation of this kind of 
retrospection bias: a comparison of the layoffs reported in the 1984 and 
1986 DWS's for the years these surveys have in common (1981-83)  reveals 
that many more layoffs are reported in the 1984 survey than in the 1986 
survey, while the analogous comparison of the plant closings reported at 
the two survey dates reveals a much smaller difference.19  One might hy- 
pothesize that (i) this large difference between the layoffs reported in 1984 
versus those reported in 1986 results because some 1986 respondents have 
simply forgotten layoffs that occurred between  1981 and 1983, and (ii) 
these forgotten layoffs were disproportionately those that did not result 
in large earnings losses. (Implicit in this pair of hypotheses is the notion 
that plant closings are memorable, even if they do not result in large earn- 
ings losses.) 
In brief, we find three reasons why retrospection bias appears not to be 
an important problem here.20  First, while we cannot reject the possibility 
that such a bias explains our results for the sample as a whole, the data do 
not support the conjecture that such a bias explains our results for white- 
versus blue-collar workers. Second, the presence of such a bias would seem 
to suggest that the lemons  effect should grow (in  absolute value) with 
years since displacement, but it does not. And third, the effect of such a 
bias would seem to be reduced for workers displaced from jobs with long 
predisplacement tenure, but (as reported in table 4) the qualitative prop- 
erties of our empirical results are not only preserved but even strengthened 
by focusing on workers with long predisplacement tenure. 
IV.  Unemployment  and Reason  for  Displacement 
Like wage changes at displacement, the unemployment experiences of 
displaced workers also appear to  differ substantially by the reason for 
displacement. In table  1 we  found  that, among permanently displaced 
workers who were reemployed at the survey date, those displaced by plant 
closings were less likely to have experienced a spell of unemployment after 
19 In our sample (including those not reemployed at the survey date), the layoffs 
reported in the 1984 DWS are 314, 504, and 484 for 1981-83, respectively, while 
those reported in the  1986 DWS are 142, 258, and 188 for the same years. The 
plant closings reported in the  1984 DWS, in contrast, are 238, 298, and 272 for 
1981-83, respectively, while those reported in the 1986 DWS are 227, 247, and 242 
for the same years. 
20  In app. 2 of an earlier version of this article (Gibbons and Katz 1989), we 
present a detailed investigation of the extent to which retrospection bias may affect 
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displacement  and had fewer  weeks of joblessness  following displacement 
than  did  workers  displaced  by layoffs.2"  Table  2 shows  that  these  differences 
in the probability  and  duration  of unemployment  between  those  displaced 
by layoffs  and those displaced  by plant  closings  are  more  pronounced  for 
white- than for blue-collar  workers. 
We know of two potential  explanations  for the fact that workers  per- 
manently  displaced  by plant closings experience  shorter  unemployment 
spells  than  do workers  permanently  displaced  by layoffs.  The first  potential 
explanation,  due to Katz  (1986), focuses  on the importance  of recall  ex- 
pectations  in the job-search  behavior  of the unemployed:  workers  displaced 
by layoffs  are  more  likely to think they may be recalled  to their  preunem- 
ployment  jobs than are  workers  displaced  in plant  closings;  higher  recall 
expectations  are likely to reduce the new-job-finding  rate by reducing 
search  intensity  and making  workers  choosier  about  new jobs. Katz  and 
Meyer  (1990) find evidence  in support  of this view:  in a sample  of unem- 
ployment  insurance  (UI) recipients  in Missouri,  workers  who expected  to 
be recalled  at the time of job loss have much lower (approximately  50% 
lower)  new-job-finding rates than do workers who  did not expect to be 
recalled. 
The  second potential explanation involves a simple extension  of  our 
lemons model. The model developed in Section II yields predictions about 
wage changes at displacement but also predicts that there will be no post- 
displacement unemployment. The latter prediction arises for a simple rea- 
son: for any belief about a worker's ability, there is always a wage low 
enough that firms will be willing to hire the worker. 
To  generate postdisplacement  unemployment,  the  model  could  be 
changed so that for sufficiently pessimistic beliefs about a worker's ability 
either no firm is willing to hire the worker or it takes time for the worker 
to find a firm that is willing to hire him or her. One could imagine, for 
example, that some firms use technologies that are extremely sensitive to 
the worker's ability, so that hiring a bad worker results in a net loss (the 
cost of broken equipment exceeds the value of output produced),  while 
other firms use technologies such as that described in Section II, so that 
there always exists a wage low enough to make the latter firms willing to 
hire a bad worker. Adding such technological heterogeneity and a job- 
search mechanism to our lemons model would yield positive (but finite) 
postdisplacement unemployment durations. The expected duration would 
be longer for workers displaced by layoffs (again, because of the lemons 
effect) than for workers displaced by plant closings. 
21 These results are consistent with the earlier findings of Kruse (1988) using the 
1984 DWS. Similarly, Katz (1986) finds using a sample of household heads from 
the  Panel Study of  Income  Dynamics  that workers who  enter unemployment 
through layoffs have lower escape rates from unemployment through the finding 
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In an attempt  to assess  the extent to which a lemons  effect  contributes 
to our finding that workers permanently displaced by layoffs experience 
longer unemployment spells than do those displaced by plant closings, we 
used the January 1986 DWS to construct a sample of first spells of job- 
lessness for 20-61  year-old males permanently displaced from full-time, 
private-sector  jobs not in agriculture  or construction.22  The sample contains 
830 complete initial spells of joblessness and 498 censored spells. 
We analyze the duration of initial spells of joblessness for this sample 
using formal hazard-model techniques. We parameterize the hazard rate 
(i.e., the escape rate from joblessness) using a Weibull specification. The 
hazard rate for individual i at time t is specified as 
Xi(t) = ata-'exp(X  6),  (6) 
where Xi is a vector of time-invariant covariates for individual i, a is the 
Weibull duration-dependence parameter, and 6 is a vector of parameters. 
(See Kalbfleisch and Prentice [1980, pp. 23-25 and 30-32]  for a discussion 
of the properties of the Weibull model.) Let Ti be the length of individual 
i's unemployment spell. The Weibull specification of the hazard function 
implies that the log  of  the failure time for i (i.e.,  Y, =  log  T1) can be 
written as a regression model of the form 
Y, =  Xi3  +  G6i,  (7) 
where a  =  1/a  is known as the Weibull scale parameter, f3  =  -a7,  and 
6i  is an error term with  an extreme-value distribution (Kalbfleisch and 
Prentice 1980, pp. 22-24). 
Table 6 presents maximum-likelihood  estimates of  Weibull duration 
models for the initial spell of joblessness following  displacement for our 
1986 DWS sample. For ease of interpretation, we present the estimates in 
the form of the regression model in equation (7): we report the parameter 
fr  for each covariate Xj. The estimates presented in table 6 thus can be 
interpreted as the effects of the covariates on the expected log duration of 
joblessness. 
22 The  January  1984  DWS  only provides  information  on total  weeks  of joblessness 
since  displacement  and  so does not allow  one to determine  the length  of the initial 
spell of joblessness.  The  January  1986  DWS,  in contrast,  provides  information  on 
the number  of jobs held by a worker  since  displacement.  This variable  and infor- 
matiop  on total weeks of joblessness  since displacement  allow one to determine 
both the length  of the initial  spell of joblessness  for those employed  in their  first 
job since displacement  at the survey  date and the censored  length of the initial 
spell  for those  who had  not worked  since  displacement.  The  variable  that  measures 
weeks of joblessness  since displacement  is top-coded  at 99. We treat  initial  spells 
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Table 6 
Effects of Selected  Variables  on the  Duration  of the  First Spell 
of Joblessness  following  Displacement  from  January  1986 CPS 
Displaced  Workers  Survey,  Males with  Only  One  Spell  of 
Joblessness  since Displacement 
Dependent Variable = Log (Weeks of Joblessness) 
Weibull Duration Model Specification 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Layoff  1  .248  .244  .352  .323 
(.086)  (.108)  (.106)  (.126) 
Layoff  x  white collar  ...  -.049  ...  ... 
(.168) 
Layoff  X high union  ...  ...  -.299  ... 
(.147) 
Layoff x  fraction union  ...  ...  ...  -.358 
(.345) 
Fraction  union  . . .  1.173  1.363  1.326 
(.266)  (.294)  (.033) 
Previous tenure in years  .037  .034  .034  .033 
(.007)  (.007)  (.007)  (.007) 
Log of previous real weekly earnings  -.301  -.339  -.331  -.333 
(.100)  (.099)  (.099)  (.099) 
Weibull scale parameter  (a)  1.146  1.139  1.137  1.139 
(.033)  (.032)  (.032)  (.032) 
Log likelihood  -1,831.3  -1,822.2  -1,820.2  -1,821.7 
NOTE.-The reported  models  were estimated  by maximum  likelihood  with left censoring  explicitly 
treated  using  the  LIFEREG  procedure  in SAS.  The  sample  size  is 1,228.  The  reported  specifications  include 
education,  a dummy  for  advance  notification  of displacement,  year-of-displacenment  dummies,  seven  previous- 
industry  dummies,  eight  previous-occupation  dummies,  experience  (age  -  education  -  6) and  its square, 
a marriage  dummy,  a nonwhite  dummy,  and  three  region  dummies.  Fraction  union  is the 1983  fraction 
unionized  of the worker's  predisplacement  industry-occupation  cell. High union  equals  one for workers 
displaced  from  industry-occupation  cells  where  the fraction  unionized  was  greater  than  25.5%  in 1983;  it 
equals  zero  otherwise.  Earnings  are  deflated  by the  GNP  deflator.  The  numbers  in parentheses  are  asymptotic 
standard  errors. 
The coefficient estimate for the layoff dummy in column  1 of table 6 
indicates that workers permanently  displaced by layoffs have approximately 
25% longer initial unemployment spells than do those displaced in plant 
closings. This finding is consistent with our (extended) lemons model but 
of course also is consistent with a recall-expectations model. In columns 
2-4  of  table  6  we  attempt  to  isolate  the  effect  due  solely  to  the 
lemons model. 
The estimates in column 2 indicate that the effect observed in column 
1 for the whole  sample also appears in both the white-  and blue-collar 
subsamples of our data set: workers permanently displaced by layoffs ex- 
perience significantly longer initial unemployment spells than do workers 
displaced by plant closings, regardless  of whether the displacement is from 
a white- or blue-collar job. (More precisely, the point estimates in col. 2 
suggest that the effect is slightly smaller for white-collar workers but far 
from statistically significantly so.) Since white-collar workers are much 374  Gibbons/Katz 
less likely to expect to be recalled than are blue-collar workers,23  the sim- 
ilarity in the impact of the layoff dummy on unemployment durations for 
the two groups suggests that a lemons effect may be influencing the post- 
displacement  unemployment duration  of white-collar workers permanently 
displaced by layoffs. 
The estimates in columns 3 and 4 are analogous to those in column 2, 
except that we use a second approach to attempt to define a subsample of 
jobs that are likely to be governed by formal layoff-by-seniority rules and 
therefore not likely to be subject to a lemons effect. As in Section IIIB, 
we classify each worker in terms of a measure of the extent of unionization 
in the worker's predisplacement industry and occupation (as described in 
n. 16 above). 
In column  3 our measure of  the extent of unionization  is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the unionization rate exceeds 25.5%  (the median 
of the sample described in Section IIIB). We find that, for workers from 
low-unionization  predisplacement industries and occupations, those dis- 
placed  by  layoffs  experience  significantly  longer  (approximately  35% 
longer) postdisplacement  unemployment durations  than do those displaced 
by plant closings. We also find that, for workers from high-unionization 
predisplacement industries and occupations, those displaced by layoffs ex- 
perience only 5% longer unemployment spells than do those displaced by 
plant closings; this difference in unemployment duration between those 
laid off from low- versus high-unionization industries and occupations is 
statistically significant. In column 4 we interact the layoff dummy with 
the  unionization  rate (i.e.,  the  continuous  variable that  underlies the 
unionization dummy described above) of the worker's predisplacement 
industry and occupation. The results are qualitatively similar to those re- 
ported in column 3. 
In sum, the evidence presented  in table 6 shows that workers permanently 
displaced by layoffs experience significantly longer initial unemployment 
durations following displacement than do workers displaced by plant clos- 
ings. While both our (extended) lemons model and a recall-expectations 
model are capable of explaining this fact, we find that the result persists 
for subsamples that seem likely to fit the lemons model but unlikely to fit 
the recall-expectations model.24 
23  Katz and Meyer (1990) find for a sample of UI recipients from Missouri and 
Pennsylvania in 1979-80 that 58%  of blue-collar workers who had spells that ended 
in a new job initially expected to be recalled by their previous employer, while 
only 25% of the comparable  sample of white-collar workers expected to be recalled. 
24  Furthermore,  Alba and Freeman ( 1990) find for a sample of displaced workers 
from Spain in the early 1980s that those  "individually fired" had substantially 
longer unemployment  durations than those  displaced by plant closings  ("firm 
shutdowns").  Since  temporary layoffs are quite unimportant in  Spain, this  is 
suggestive evidence of a lemons effect from layoffs operating in the Spanish labor 
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V.  Summary  and Interpretation 
In this article we develop and find empirical support for an asymmetric- 
information model of layoffs. The model is based on a seemingly plausible 
form of asymmetric information: a worker's current employer is assumed 
to be better  informed about the worker's productive ability than prospective 
employers are. The  key  feature of  the model  is that, when  firms have 
discretion with respect to whom to lay off, the market infers that laid-off 
workers are of low  ability. Under the assumption that no such negative 
inference is warranted if workers are displaced in a plant closing,  our 
model predicts that the postdisplacement wages of otherwise observation- 
ally equivalent workers will be lower for those displaced by layoffs than 
for those displaced by plant closings. Furthermore, in our model it is the 
layoff event that signals unfavorable information to  the market, so the 
model predicts that the predisplacement wages of (otherwise observation- 
ally) equivalent workers will not differ according to the cause of displace- 
ment. Finally, a simple extension of our model predicts that the average 
postdisplacement unemployment spell of otherwise observationally equiv- 
alent workers will  be shorter for those displaced by plant closings than 
for those permanently displaced by layoffs. 
Using data on a large sample of permanently displaced workers, we find 
two kinds of evidence consistent with the lemons effect predicted by our 
model. First, with respect to pre- and postdisplacement earnings, the post- 
displacement earnings of white-collar workers who are displaced by layoffs 
are significantly lower than those of white-collar workers displaced by 
plant closings, but predisplacement earnings do not vary with  cause of 
displacement. Second, white-collar workers permanently displaced by lay- 
offs endure postdisplacement unemployment spells that are significantly 
longer than those  endured by white-collar  workers displaced by plant 
closings. The fact that both of these findings are consistent with our model 
may bode well for future theoretical and empirical work on wages and 
mobility based on the information asymmetry we analyze. Alternatively, 
our empirical results can be interpreted as support for certain symmetric- 
information models. 
In order for a symmetric-information model  to match our empirical 
findings, the model must first provide descriptions of why layoffs occur 
(rather than wage changes) and of which  workers are laid off. Having 
done this, the model must then explain why laid-off workers fare worse 
than those displaced by plant closings, in terms of postdisplacement wages 
and unemployment durations, but are no different in terms of predisplace- 
ment wages. 
In a symmetric-information model in which a worker of a given ability 
is equally productive in all firms, the equilibrium response to bad news 
about a worker's ability is a wage reduction, not a layoff. Our asymmetric- 376  Gibbons/Katz 
information model, in contrast, strongly motivates a layoff rather than a 
wage reduction in response to bad news about a worker's ability. In equi- 
librium, the firm cannot retain low-ability  workers at a low  wage: if it 
could, it would also retain high-ability workers at the low  wage, which 
would destroy the market's  willingness to allow any workers to be retained 
at the low wage. 
In a symmetric-information model in which firm-specific human capital 
and (general-purpose) ability are complements, it could be that a firm's 
optimal response to a demand shock is to lay off low-ability workers be- 
cause the return on such workers' specific capital is low. In such a model, 
however, laid-off workers should have low predisplacement wages as well 
as low  postdisplacement wages. We find no  empirical support for the 
former prediction. 
One symmetric-information model that matches our empirical findings 
involves learning and sticky wages. Suppose that, at the beginning of a 
worker's career, information about the worker's productive ability is im- 
perfect but symmetric: the worker, the firm, and the market all hold the 
same (imprecise) belief.25  As the worker's career progresses, the worker, 
the firm, and the market all observe the same information about the work- 
er's performance, so at any point in the worker's career, the worker, the 
firm, and the market all hold a common belief about the worker's ability. 
If wages are sticky (perhaps because wages are attached to jobs, as in an 
internal labor market), layoffs may occur if the worker's productivity turns 
out to be much lower than was at first expected. Because information is 
symmetric, the market does not learn from the layoff per se (unlike in our 
lemons model),  but the market does take the opportunity that a layoff 
presents to reduce the worker's wage. 
A second reason layoffs might occur in a symmetric-information model 
involves matching.26  Suppose, for instance, that there are two industries: 
in industry  A, output is very sensitive to ability, while in industry  B, output 
is relatively insensitive to ability. Suppose further  that, if information about 
25 Such  an information  structure  would arise  if, e.g., the worker's  schooling  is a 
noisy indicator  of the worker's  productive  ability  and,  unlike  the familiar  Spence 
formulation,  the combination  of the worker's  lack  of experience  in the labor  market 
and  firms'  wealth  of experience  in evaluating  new workers  implies  that  the worker 
and all the firms  are  equally  able  to predict  the worker's  productive  ability. 
26 Matching  can yield layoffs in asymmetric-information  models, as well; see 
Antel  (1985)  and  McLaughlin  (1991).  These  models  focus  on the  distinction  between 
quits and layoffs  but are silent concerning  plant closings.  If layoffs  occur when 
match  quality  at the current  firm  is relatively  low (i.e., lower than match  quality 
at an outside  firm)  but  plant  closings  occur  when  match  quality  at the current  firm 
is absolutely  low (i.e., at the bottom of the distribution  of match  quality), then 
the distribution  of postdisplacement  match  quality  will have  more weight in the 
lower tail after  a plant closing. Such a model seems unlikely  to reproduce  our 
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workers' productive abilities were perfect, then high-ability workers would 
be employed in industry A and low-ability workers would be employed 
in industry B. As described above, however, information about workers' 
abilities is imperfect but improves over time. As a result, at the beginning 
of their careers, workers who  appear to be of high-(respectively,  low-) 
ability are employed in industry A (respectively, B).  Over time, as new 
information about workers' productive abilities becomes available,  mobility 
endogenously improves the matching of workers with industries.27 
Two  kinds of  mobilit4  occur in  this matching model: workers who 
perform surprisingly well  move from industry B to A,  while  those who 
perform surprisingly poorly move from industry A to B.  If we  call the 
former a quit and the latter  a layoff, then this matching model also generates 
the main empirical prediction of our lemons model-laid-off  workers re- 
ceive low reemployment wages. The data do not provide further support 
for this matching model, however. We reestimated the postdisplacement 
earnings equation for white-collar workers (table 3, row 2, col. 3) with 
the addition of both a dummy variable equal to one if the worker's reem- 
ployment industry differs from the worker's predisplacement industry (at 
the one-digit  level)  and the interaction of  this dummy with  the layoff 
dummy. We found that (i) the coefficient on the switch-industry dummy 
is negative, large (in absolute value),  and statistically significant; (ii)  the 
coefficient on the layoff dummy is essentially identical to the coefficient 
reported in table 3 (i.e.,  -.064),  but the standard error is large enough 
that the coefficient is no longer significant at conventional levels; and (iii) 
the coefficient on the interaction between the switch-industry and layoff 
dummies is extremely small (but positive).  This third result is hard to 
reconcile with the matching model sketched above, which suggests that 
laid-off workers who  switch industries should receive especially low  re- 
employment wages. 
In sum, the predictions of our lemons model can be generated by some 
(but by no means all) symmetric-information  models. Our empirical  results 
therefore are not conclusive proof that asymmetric information plays an 
important role in the labor market. Rather, we interpret the results as a 
necessary (but not sufficient) condition for confidence in models based on 
asymmetric  information about workers' abilities:  had our estimates rejected 
our model, it would have cast doubt on the entire family of models based 
on  this kind of  asymmetric information (as well  as on  the symmetric- 
information models that generate the same predictions).  Unfortunately, 
the nature of asymmetric information seems to imply that direct empirical 
27  See Gibbons and Katz ( 1991  ) for a precise statement of this model, which is 
akin to a dynamic version of Roy's (1951)  model, extended to include imperfect 
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tests  of its importance  are  not possible,  so indirect  tests  of the  kind  presented 
here  may be all that is possible. 
Appendix 
Construction and Characterization of Equilibria 
This appendix  provides  the details of two arguments  left incomplete 
in the text. First, we  complete  the proof that there exists a continuum 
of equilibria parameterized by TR,  which ranges from flL  to A9  *  given in 
(3).  Second,  we  show  that,  even  in  equilibria not  belonging  to  the 
continuum of equilibria parameterized  by TR (if such alternative  equilibria 
exist),  our main qualitative conclusion continues to hold: w2(L) < E(n). 
Part 1.-We  first establish that there exists a unique f * satisfying (3) 
and that i  *  <  iHy.  At  l *  =  rIL,  the right-hand side of (3)  exceeds the 
left; at ii * =  i1H,  the left exceeds the right; and the derivative of the left- 
hand side with respect to  q * is one, which exceeds the derivative of the 
right-hand side  because the  fact that f(rj)  is log  concave  implies  that 
d {E(l  n  x) }/dx  <  1 for every x. Note  (for use below) that the same 
monotonicity  argument implies that, if  fR  <  a,  then  lR  +  s <  E(l  n 
2  TR). 
We  show  next that given a value of  flR  <  a*,  there exists a unique 
solution  to  ( 1  ).  At  wm7  =  flL,  the  right-hand  side  of  (1)  is  positive 
because the first term is positive and the probability term in the second 
term is zero. At wm  =  fH,  the right-hand  side is negative  because  the 
first term  is  negative and  the  second  term  is  either negative  or  zero 
(depending on whether the probability term is positive or zero).  Finally, 
the  derivative of  the  right-hand  side  with  respect to  wm,  is  negative 
because d{F(x)[E(I  1  < x)  -  x] }/dx  =  -F(x)  < 0  for every x.  Thus, 
given fR,  (1)  has a unique solution. Furthermore, this solution is a best 
response for prospective employers, given that the firm lays off a worker 
if and only if the worker's ability is less than flR.  Offering a lower wage 
attracts no  workers  and  so  earns no  profit.  Offering  a  higher  wage 
attracts all rather than half of the pool of workers that would otherwise 
accept the  market's offer  and  also  attracts the  lowest-ability  workers 
that the firm would otherwise retain, but the prospective employer earns 
negative profit on both groups. 
Finally, we show  (by contradiction) that, if  lR  <  a  *,  then (2)  holds: 
rlR  +  S <  Wm_ where Wm is the solution  to  (1).  If  fR  +  s >  Wm,,  then 
proben  +  S  <  WmIf  ?  nR  =  0, SO the solution to (1)  is Wm  = E(nln 
2  flR),  but then lR  + s > E(,  In  flR),  which contradicts  the assumption 
that flR  <  'i *  (because of the last sentence of the first paragraph of part 
1 above). 
Part 2.-We  show  next  that  any  equilibrium layoff rule leads to  a 
reemployment wage for laid-off workers satisfying w2(L)  <  E(q).  Just 
as in the argument leading to (2)  in the text, if the firm's layoff rule has 
L(,q) =  1 for some  q, then it must be that q +  s < wm,  so E [lIL(nq) 
=  1] <  wmn.  But the  analog of  (1),  modified  to  account for the  layoff 
rule under consideration, is Layoffs  and Lemons  379 
O = p{E[n  IL(n) = O]-wnz}  + (1-pg)prob{ll  +s<wm  IL(,l)  = O} 
X {E[ljlfl  +s<wmL(n)  = 0]-Wm},  (Al) 
which implies that 
wTee  o  E,  [  I  L(n)  = O], so E[X I  L(n)  =  1] < E[X I  L(n)  = O]. 
Therefore, 
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